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F.C. DeCoste*

Caesar's Faith: Limited Government and
Freedom of Religion in Bruker v Marcovitz

The Supreme Court of Canada has long pursued the view that our law is somehow
an expression and repository of what it terms "Canada 's fundamental values." In
Bruker v. Marcovitz, the Court added to the catalogue of these judicially decreed
and enforced values one concerning religion, namely, the protection of Canadians
against the arbitrary disadvantages of their religions. This comment argues that
the Court's judgment in this regard constitutes a fundamental threat to religious
liberty inasmuch as it subordinates religious belief and practice to state values by
making the legal acceptability of the former turn on their conformity to the latter

La Cour supreme du Canada est depuis longtemps d'avis que notre droit est,
en quelque sorte, 1 la fois Iexpression et le depositaire de ce qu'elle qualifie de
,, valeurs canadiennes fondamentales -. Dans I'arr~tBruker c. Marcovitz, la Cour
a ajout6 au r6pertoire de ces valeurs d6finies et appliqudes judiciairement une
valeur qui a trait J la religion, c'est-6-dire la protection des Canadiens contre
les d6savantages arbitraires de leurs religions. L'auteur prdtend que I'arr~t de la
Cour J cet egardconstitue une menace fondamentale 6 la libert6 de religion dans
la mesure ot) il assujettit les croyances et la pratique religieuses des valeurs
de IEtat en statuant que I'acceptabiit6Idgale des croyances et de la pratique
religieuses est fonction de leur conformit6 aux valeurs de I'-tat.

*

Professor of Law, University of Alberta.

154

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
I. Preliminaries
1. Facts
2. Priorproceedings
a. Quebec Superior Court: the alchemy ofform
b. Quebec Court of Appeal: substance rulesform
II. At the court
1. The dissent: shield not sword
2. The majority:protectingcitizensfrom their religion
a. Content
b. Consequences
Conclusion

[P]olitics and the pulpit are terms that have little agreement. ... The
cause of civil liberty and civil government gains as little as that of
religion by th[eir]confusion .... Those who quit theirpropercharacter
to assume what does not belong to them are, for the greater part,
ignorant both of the character they leave and the character they
assume.
- Edmund Burket

Introduction
In Bruker v. Marcovitz,z the Supreme Court of Canada had before it two
issues of much and enduring moment to the conduct and character of
limited government. The Court had first to decide when a liberal state
might properly claim, through its judicial branch, sovereignty over matters
involving or affecting religion. It had then to decide how the judicial branch
ought properly to exercise that sovereignty, on what grounds and towards
which ends. I say that these issues-the one concerning justiciability and the
other judgment-have wide and lasting significance to liberal governance
just because religious liberty is itself so essential and foundational a part
of the scheme of ordered liberty. For freedom of religion, along with the

1. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France,ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1987) at 10-11.
2.
Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54 (Deschamps and Charron JJ. dissenting) [Bruker].
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freedom of the family,3 is the seat and source of the moral independence,
personal and institutional, which is the mark, measure, and meaning of
limited government. It will be my purpose in this too brief comment to
persuade that the Court's judgment on these matters in Bruker constitutes
a grave threat to religious liberty and with that, to freedom under and
through law more generally. I shall argue that this is so because Bruker
subordinates religion to the state in a fashion and by means heretofore
unthinkable. To be precise: Bruker threatens to make conformity to state
values the measure of the acceptability at law of the faith of individuals
and communities; it does so by rendering the state's values-what I have
here dubbed Caesar's faith-superior to the precepts and practices of faith;
and in this, as I shall later argue, totalizing fashion, it so turns the "precious
achievement ' 4 of religious liberty upside down and inside out, that little
may remain of it beyond state sufferance.
Before pursuing this argument, I should make clear that my sole
concern in this comment is the Court's understanding of the relationship
that properly obtains between state and religion. I do not here therefore
engage many of the issues5 with which the Court tangled. My rationale
is simple enough: though Bruker is indeed a complicated and complex
judgment, its sense, its outcome, and especially its importance, in my
view, all finally reside in the Court's theory of the relationship between
the state and religious practice. That said, I shall proceed as follows. After
rehearsing the facts and reviewing the judgments of the trial and appellate
courts, one and all so important here, I shall analyze Justice Deschamps's
dissent (Charron J. concurring) that offers a tightly reasoned presentation
of the standing view of the state's proper relationship to faith. I shall then
pursue my argliment against the content and consequences of Justice
Abella's majority judgment (McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie,
LeBel, Fish, and Rothstein JJ. concurring).

3.
A few comments towards its conclusion aside, this comment is not the place to defend or to
explore either the place of the family in the scheme of ordered liberty or the relationship between
religious liberty and liberty of the family. Concerning the former matter, see for example, Linda
C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jennifer Roback Morse, "No Families, No Freedom: Human
Flourishing in a Free Society" (1999) 16:1 Social Philosophy & Policy 290.
4.
Jurgen Habermas, "Notes on a post-secular society" (18/06/2008), online: Sign and Sight <http://
www.signandsight.com/features/1 7114.html>.
5.
About which, see infra note 82.
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Preliminaries

1. Facts
The issues in Bruker arose from a sad and rather sordid tale of contemporary
marriage and divorce. Stephanie Bruker was a twenty-year-old university
student and Jason Marcovitz Was a thirty-two-year old divorc6 when they
married in 1969. Both were (vaguely on the facts reported) observant Jews,
he, Orthodox and she Conservative. Because Ms. Bruker was unable to
conceive, the couple adopted two girls, one born in 1976 and the other in
1978. In April of 1980, Ms. Bruker initiated divorce proceedings. During
the marriage and unbeknownst to Mr. Marcovitz, she was involved in an
extra-martial affair with a former college sweetheart, who also was Jewish,
by whom she did become pregnant. She terminated the pregnancy in July
1979.
By July 1980, the parties with the assistance. of their counsel had
amicably settled on a number of corollary matters including child custody
and support, the occupation and sale of the matrimonial home, and a
lump-sum payment of spousal support to Ms. Bruker. This "Consent to
Corollary Relief," subsequently twice ratified judicially, also contained a
paragraph, Paragraph 12, that stipulated as follows:
The parties appear before the Rabbinical authorities in the City and
District of Montreal for the purpose of obtaining the traditional religious
Get, immediately upon the Decree Nisi of divorce being granted.
A Get is a divorce under Judaic law. Though it Is supervised by a Rabbinic
court, called a Beth Din, divorce like marriage is consensual under Judaic
law: as it is the parties (and not the Rabbi) who marry themselves, it is
the parties (and not the Beth Din) who divorce themselves. Since the Get
must be consensual on both sides, where one. party refuses, the two remain
married under Judaic law despite the wishes of the party who wants the
marriage dissolved and despite the status of the marriage under state law.
However, because under Judaic law the husband only can initiate a divorce
(and he may do so for any reason or for no reason at all) and because the
wife can neither prevent him from so doing nor force him so to do, the
Jewish rules of divorce, beneath their consensual surface, impact women
in a special way. If a husband refuses to initiate a religious divorce on
marriage breakdown, the wife becomes an agunah (she is chained to a
dead marriage) and she can either accept her agunah status or accept the
consequences of her refusal to do so. The consequences are substantial in
religious terms. Not only is the wife forbidden ever to marry another man,
but should she couple with one, she becomes an adulteress and should she
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bear a child, the child is declared a mamzer (bastard) who may within the
faith marry only another mamzer or a convert to Judaism. Viewed from
this vantage, then, the Get is really a permission, the sole source of which
is the husband, which allows Jewish women to remarry and bear children
6
within their faith.
In Bruker, the decree nisi was granted in October 1980. However, by
that time relations between the parties had deteriorated and in consequence,
Marcovitz refused to comply with the Paragraph 12 agreement to appear
before the Beth Din to consent to a Get. From there, matters deteriorated
still further. Numerous proceedings-including an attempt by Bruker to
have Marcovitz cited for contempt (it was dismissed)-ensued. Marcovitz
complained about Bruker's frustrating access to the children, and Bruker
complained about his failure to pay child support. In 1989, Bruker moved
from Montreal to New York City where she claimed her agunah status
prevented her from successfully pursuing marriage with a Conservative
Jewish man. During this time, Bruker became estranged from her
daughters, one of whom indeed was taken from her and placed in foster
care.
In July 1989, Bruker sued Marcovitz for damages in the amount of
$500,000 for his failure to comply with Paragraph 12 of the Consent.
She proceeded in this fashion, it should be noted, because the Divorce
Act does not contemplate actions in damages or specific performance for
an alleged breach of an order issued under the Act.7 This amount was
calculated as follows: $200,000 "for having been restrained from getting
on with her life since the Decree Nisi"; $200,000 "for having been
restrained to remarry according to the Jewish faith"; and $100,000 "for
having been restrained of having children." Marcovitz defended the action
on a number of grounds including that Bruker too failed to honour parts
of the Consent and that his refusal to honour Paragraph 12 was a matter
of religious conscience.
For reasons not entirely certain, on 5 December 1995, Marcovitz
finally, some fifteen years late, appeared before the Beth Din in Montreal
and the rabbis issued the Get. Bruker was then forty-seven years old
and Marcovitz sixty-three. This turn of events did not however lead her

6.
See Irwin H. Haut, Divorce in Jewish Law and Life (New York: Sepher-Hermon Press, 1983),
Part I; Irving A. Breitowitz, Between Civil and Religious Law: The Plight of the Agunah in American
Society (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993) at c. 1.
7.
See Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, (2nd Supp.), c. 3, s. 17 which permits only their variation,
rescission or suspension. See also Hilton J.A.'s commentary in Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2005] R.J.Q.
2482 at paras. 39, 84 (Que. C.A.) and Deschamps J.'s dissent in Bruker, supra note 2 at paras. 158161.
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to abandon her action in damages. Instead, in June 1996 she amended
her claim by increasing the amount to $1,350,000 to account for a new
head, loss of consortium, which she valued at $750,000. Marcovitz in
turn amended his defense. The action, he thenceforth claimed, should be
dismissed because, inter alia, Paragraph 12 is an unenforceable moral
obligation, the action violates his freedom of religion and conscience, and
Jewish divorce is a religious matter in all respects beyond the reach of civil
courts. It was those amended pleadings that found their way first to the
Quebec Superior Court and subsequently to the Quebec Court of Appeal
and to the Supreme Court of Canada.
2. Priorproceedings
a. Quebec Superior Court: the alchemy ofform
Mass J. is quick and succinct:
Defendant claims that he had a religious obligation, not a civil one, and
thus this dispute cannot be adjudicated before a civil court. However, once
the Defendant signed a civil contract, agreeing to appear immediately
before Rabbinical authorities, this obligation moved into the realm of the
civil courts, and the religious obligation became embedded in a secular
agreement. Consequently, the Defendant had a clear and unequivocal
civil law obligation to appear "immediately" before the Rabbinical
authorities. He did not appear, however, for 15 years. Once there is a civil
contract, even if its object relates to religious obligations, it is justiciable
and within the jurisdiction of the civil court ... ,
Simply put, a valid civil obligation with religious undertones was created.
Since Defendant breached this obligation, Plaintiff is entitled to seek
.damages before a civil court.'
In the judge's view those "religious undertones" do not mean much. The
issue here, "the assessment of damages due to Defendant's long delay in
granting the Get," he says, "raises no issues of enforcement of a religious
obligation."9 On the contrary, "the pith and essence of what is being asked
for in this case is not religious. ... [A] Get is not being asked for, rather the
case is an assessment of damages stemming from a factual situation which
involves Jewish parties and Jewish institutions-but principles of Jewish
law do not have to be examined in depth."
This is to affirm both that contractual form has preeminence at law over
religious content and that contractual form serves to empty at law otherwise
religious matters of their religious significance. Both propositions are,
8.
9.
10.

[2003] R.J.Q. 1189 at paras. 19-20.
Ibid. at para. 25.
Ibid. at para. 30.
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without very much more, risible. The first would have us believe that any
religious matter is justiciable provided only that it is clothed in contract.
But, were that a principle of our law, judges would be authorized in family
law matters to assess damages for breach of a wide range of religious
undertakings, such as a promise to raise children in a particular faith or
the promise to act as a model of religious devotion for them, provided
only the promise appears in a Consent to Corollary Relief. Nor of course
is the silliness confined to the family law context. Suppose I undertake
as part of a contract of sale, for example, of your family business, to quit
the Catholic Church and to become a congregant of the First Assembly of
Christ. On the Judge's view of matters, my breach of those undertakings
is without more justiciable just because of their contractual form and
the only question for the court is whether you the vendor can make out
damages (and judging by the trial result in Bruker-about which more in a
moment-that should not be too onerous a burden).
The second proposition requires that we suspend judgment. Here, our
judgment must tell us that both the, matter and consequences of which
Bruker complained were wholly religious in nature. The promise after
all was to attend at a religious ceremony concerning the dissolution of a
religious marriage, the threshold to both of which, the ceremony and the
outcome alike, was a religious intention by the parties, including notably
their not having bound themselves previously either to attend or on the
outcome." And the consequences too were wholly religious, both in kind
and by cause. That this is so is reflected, remarkably, in Mass J.'s damages
award.
The Judge dismissed both the first and last head of damages (loss
of consortium).12 His dismissal of the first head, those flowing from Ms.
Bruker "having been restrained from getting on with her life since the
Decree Nisi of Divorce," is especially telling. As put by Mass J.:
From the evidence brought before the Court, Plaintiff's enjoyment of life
was in no way diminished by her failure to obtain her Get. Indeed, she
testified that during the relevant period, she had many male lovers, many
friends, an active social life and engaged in various business activities.
While the various medical records produced show she was going through
some emotional turmoil during the relevant period, such turmoil was to
a large part due to her self-questioning, her seeking to satisfy her sexual
appetites and needs, and her role in society generally. 3

11.
12.
offer
13.

About which see Hilton J.A.'s judgment in Bruker, supra note 7 at paras. 46-47.
The judge dismissed damages for loss of consortium on grounds that "Plaintiff did not refuse any
of marriage" on account of not having a Get: supra note 8 at para. 53.
Ibid. at para. 44.

160

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Having thus dismissed the secular consequences, the judge sets his
sights on the religious consequences. As regards damages flowing from
her "having been restrained to remarry according to the Jewish faith,' he
offers the following marvel of curial meddling in religious affairs:
While there is no evidence that any suitor broke off his relationship
with Plaintiff because of her inability to marry him before a Rabbi ...indeed there is no evidence of any offer to marry at all-Plaintiff was
nevertheless entitled to exercise her freedom of religious choice as she
alone determined it. ... Matters of religious conscience must be left to the
adult parties invoking them and not be imposed by others. Plaintiff has
satisfied the Court that despite her many deviations from the doctrines
and precepts of the Orthodox Jewish Community-her abortion, extramarital affairs, use of contraceptives, etc.-Plaintiff was and remained
a member of the Orthodox branch of the Jewish community, that she
therefore had the right to remarry before a rabbi of that community and
to do so, would have needed a Get from a Beth Din recognized by such
a community.'4
So religious consequences there only are and the Court will manage
these as it sees fit (by inter alia disregarding religious law and declaring
religious absolution and standing) in service to awarding civil damages.
Finally as regards damages flowing from "her having been restricted
of having children," the Judge first admits that since Plaintiff "failed
to adduce any evidence that any relationship which could have led to
marriage foundered on her not having a Get, she was not prevented from
having [a religiously legitimate] child with such a partner.' 5 Yet, he then
concludes that damages nonetheless properly sound because, under Judaic
law, "she was generally unable to have ...
a legitimate child" and because
that "affected her choice of male companions and lovers."' 16 Mass J.
awarded $37,500 for restriction of religious remarriage ($2,500 for each
of the fifteen years Marcovitz refused to cooperate in obtaining the Get)
and $10,000 for restriction of having those spectral, religiously legitimate
children."
All of which is to say, whatever consequences Marcovitz's failure to
live up to Paragraph 12 had for Bruker, those consequences were religious
in origin and in kind: though her civic personality remained completely
intact-under Canadian law, as a divorced person, she was free, just like
14. Ibid. atparas. 46-47. Incidentally, despite his meddling in affairs religious, the judge got his facts
wrong: Bruker, as the Quebec Court of Appeal would later note, was not an Orthodox Jew, she was a
Conservative Jew.
15. Ibid.at para. 51.
16. Ibid.at para. 52.
17. Ibid.at paras. 49, 52, 62.
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everyone else so situated, to remarry and have children without legal
restriction-her private devotional self suffered the religious consequences
of her devotion to Conservative Judaism.
We shall see next that neither the Quebec Court of Appeal nor the
Supreme Court of Canada was fooled by the Superior Court's spurious
defense of its judgment to sanction Marcovitz and to reward Bruker.
However, whilst the Court of Appeal simply declared the defense
"erroneous"'18 . and overturned the result, a majority at the Supreme Court
sought that something more that would make sense of a result it endorsed.
This it did by articulating a way to tame the judicial supervision of religious
undertakings that the trial court let loose on our law. We shall see too, alas,
that the Court's solution is more dangerous still.
b. Quebec Court ofAppeal: substance rulesform
On appeal, Marcovitz sought the reversal of Mass J.'s judgment and the
dismissal of Bruker's action. In cross-appeal, Bruker sought an increase
of the damages award to the $1,350,000 amount claimed in her 1996
amended claim. In allowing the appeal, Hilton J.A. (Dutil and Bick JJ.A.
concurring) ruled that religious substance, and not the happenstance of
secular form, is determinative.
Hilton J.A. puts the issue thus: "does Mr. Marcovitz's refusal to
respect the agreement ...mean that he has exposed himself to damages,
or, does the nature of the obligation stray into the domain of religion that is
normally beyond the ken of the secular courts?"' 19 His answer is elegant:
Although one cannot help but be sympathetic to the plight of a Jewish
woman whose former husband delays or denies her a ghet ..., I have
concluded that the substance of the former husband's obligation is
religious in nature, irrespective of the form in which the obligation
is stated, and accordingly, that an alleged breach of the obligation
is not enforceable by the secular courts to obtain damages or specific
performance.20
In support of this ruling, Hilton J.A. offers a rewarding analysis of the
nature of religious liberty and of the relationship that properly obtains
between the state and religion. He first identifies the twofold obligation
of the judicial branch in matters involving or respecting religion: on the
one hand, courts must distance themselves "from becoming involved in
18. Supra note 7 at para. 82.
19. Ibid at para. 49.
20. Ibid at para. 76. See also para. 83 ("the substance of the obligation was religious and not secular
with religious undertones, as the trial judge held") and para. 88 ("the most that can be said from a civil
law perspective of the obligation ...
is that it is a moral obligation").
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disputes between parties that are internal to their religions" and on the
other hand, they must "respect the fundamental principles of freedom
of religion and the exercise of religious conscience."' 21 From the first

obligation flows the commandment that governs in matters such as those
at play in Bruker:
Manifestly, it is not the role of the secular courts to palliate the
discriminatory effect of the absence of a ghet on a Jewish woman who
wants to obtain one, any more than it would be appropriate for secular
courts, in an extra-contractual context, to become involved in similar
disputes involving other religions where unequal treatment is the fate of
women in terms of their access to positions in the clergy, or as we have

seen recently in other contexts, the fate reserved for same-sex couples
being denied
the right to marry in religious ceremonies of some religious
22
faiths.

Which is to say, it does not fall to the courts to imprint upon religion
the values, legal equality especially, that the state, so far as public affairs
are concerned, properly exists to serve. Applied here, this commandment
means precisely what the judge says it means: "If there is any relief
available to Ms. Bruker, it is in a religious forum, not a secular one. '"23
The second obligation, to protect freedom of religion, is the ultimate
source of this prohibition. This is so because freedom of religion is a
negative liberty, a liberty from state interference and coercion, the sole
focus and meaning of which is to prohibit the state's doing things to
religion, to religious conduct and conscience.24 Or so the Court seems,
rightly, to think. Hilton J.A. puts it this way:
The purpose of freedom of religion or the exercise of religious freedom
should not be interpreted as having a coercive component. In essence,
freedom of religion is a fundamental personal right. Canadian courts do

not have the protection of religion per se as part of their mission. Rather,
recourse can be had to Canadian courts to ensure that individuals can
act in accordance with their religious beliefs, subject to laws of general
application that satisfy provisions such as section 1 of the Canadian
Charter."

21. Ibid. at para. 77. See also para. 50.
22. Ibid. at para. 76.
23. Ibid. at para. 90
24. John Finnis has recently put the matter nicely: religious liberty, he says, is "an immunity, of
individuals and groups, from coercion ...
in respect of religious belief, and all those expressions
of religious belief, or other acts of putting one's religious belief into practice .
Nice too is his
statement of the implication: "So state governments and legal systems have a negative duty: not to
coerce religious acts .
See: John Finnis, "Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources"
(2006) 51 Am. J. Juris. 107 at 117, 124.
25. Supra note 7 at para. 78.
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Applied here, this conception of negative religious liberty casts Bruker's
claim and Marcovitz's position in stark jurisprudential relief. As regards
Bruker, the Court concludes that she "does not seek the Court's protection
for the exercise of her freedom of religion. Instead, she seeks to be
indemnified for Mr. Marcovitz's failure, from her perspective, to perform
a religious act that the evidence shows he could not [under Judaic law]
be compelled to perform and could only perform voluntarily, despite a
pre-existing undertaking to do so. '' 26 In consequence-and this surely is
the root and leaf of it-"[t]o condemn Mr. Marcovitz to pay damages in
such circumstances would be inconsistent with the recognition of his
right to execute his religious beliefs or duties as he sees fit without curial
intervention."27 It would, that is, violate his right to be left alone by the
state in matters of his religious life.
It was with this thoughtful and respectful judgment that the Supreme
Court of Canada chose subsequently to contend. We shall see that the
majority simply side-stepped it, and that the dissent insisted, often
scathingly, on its wisdom.
II. At the court
That leave was granted in Brukerwas perhaps an early signal that something
momentous was in the offing.28 This is certainly the way things worked out.
The Court had at hand the poorly constructed judgment of the Superior
Court and Hilton J.A.'s solidly reasoned redaction of the jurisprudence
and tradition of religious liberty. Unhappily, the Court largely ignored the
latter and set itself instead to salvaging the credibility of the former.29 This
it did by means both novel and devastating and in disregard of the warning
of the dissenting justices.

26. Ibid at para. 79.
27. Ibid at para. 80.
28. Bruker filed for leave on 18 November 2005, just short of two months after the Quebec Court
of Appeal handed down its judgment (20 September 2005). Leave to appeal was granted 28 April
2006 (coram: Binnie, Deschamps and Abella JJ.) on the following issue: "whether secular courts
are precluded from adjudicating a breach of a [religious] obligation agreed to in a civil contract."
See: Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings, "Judgements on Applications For Leave"
(28 April 2006) at 591, online: <http://scc.lexum.umontreal/en/bulletin/2006/06-04-28.bul.wpd/0604-28>. The Court heard argument on 5 December 2006, and delivered its judgment on 14 December
2007. Marcovitz subsequently filed a motion for a re-hearing which was dismissed on 10 March
2008: Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings, "Motions" (20 March 2008) at 465, online:
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/enibulletin/2008/08-03-20.bul/08-03-20,bul.pdf>.
29. The majority devotes a scant three paragraphs to the latter, none of which exceeds mere reportage:
Bruker, supra note 2 at 36-38.
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1. The dissent: shield not sword
Straightaway, Deschamps J. casts the issue in Bruker against the tradition
of religious liberty as a negative freedom: "The question before the Court is
whether the civil courts can be used not only as a shield to protect freedom
of religion, but also as a weapon to sanction a religious undertaking."30
She then adds that whilst "many would have thought it obvious in the 2 1st
century, the answer is no," the majority's conclusion "amounts to saying
yes."'" After this happy beginning Deschamps J. devotes the remainder
of her dissent to a defense of the traditional view of the matter and to
criticism of the majority's reasoning. I shall pause briefly on each aspect.
Though marred by her preoccupation with multiculturalism 3 2 (and
more on this matter when we come to the majority), her defense of
religious liberty as negative liberty begins where it ought, with the
state's proper relationship to religion. Deschamps J. puts this simple
matter-which at one point she terms, "this principle of non-intervention
in religious practices"33-simply: "the state is neutral where religion is
concerned"3 4 and "the courts" must therefore "remain neutral where
religious precepts are concerned."35 This "'negative' view of freedom of
barred from considering a question
religion" 36 does not mean "a court is ...
of a religious nature."37 It does, however, mean that the judicial branch is
only properly seized of authority in such matters when "the claim is based
on the violation of a rule recognized in positive law," public or private,
since that alone provides "a neutral basis for distinguishing cases in which
intervention is appropriate from those in which it is not. '38 Neutrality,
then, is a fundamental (and in her view, "deeply rooted"3 9) limitation on
curial meddling in religious affairs since courts are thereby "limited to
ensuring that laws are constitutional and, in the case of a private dispute,
to identifying the point at which rights converge so as to ensure respect for
freedom of religion."4

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Ibid. atpara. 101.
Ibid.
Ibid atparas. 102, 103, 120, 181.
Ibid.atpara. 131.
Ibid at para. 120.
Ibid.atpara. 102.
Ibid.atpara. 121.
Ibid.atpara. 122.
Ibid.
Ibid.atpara. 127.
Ibid.atpara. 126.
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It is this understanding of religious liberty and the state neutrality that
it commands that compel the dissent's rejection of Bruker's appeal. As put
by Deschamps J.:
In the instant case, the appellant has not argued that her civil rights were
infringed by a civil standard derived from positive law. Only her religious
rights are in issue, and only as a result of religious rules. Thus, she is not
asking to be compensated because she could not remarry as a result of
a civil rule. It was a rule of her religion that prevented her from doing
so. She is not asking to be compensated because any children she might
have given birth to would not have the same civil rights as 'legitimate'
children. In Canadian law..., all children are equal whether born of a
marriage or not.a'
In consequence, the obligation created by Paragraph 12 of the Consent
"[can] at most be considered a moral undertaking"42 that "may not be
enforced civilly."43
This understanding and this result compel the dissent's wholehearted
condemnation of the majority. First, if this result is correct as a matter of
law, then the majority's judgment in this matter "is not authorized under
either public law or private law."' Second, if this understanding of religious
liberty is correct jurisprudentially and culturally, then the majority's
lawlessness is "a first"45 that carries profound consequences. 46 For by
allowing the appeal, the majority is allowing "the state," through its own
judicial office, "to promote a religious norm, '47 namely, "the undertaking
to appear before rabbinical authorities for a religious divorce. '48 And there
resides the rub: "the role of the courts cannot be altered without calling into
question the foundations of the relationship between state and religion."49
In the minority's view, that is, it puts at issue the very "neutrality of the state
in Canadian law."50 Nor, finally, is the minority seduced by the majority's

41. Ibid. at para. 131.
42. Ibid. at para. 176.
43. Ibid. atpara. 175.
44. Ibid. at para. 103.
45. Ibid.
46. Deschamps J. in fact calculates the consequences at both the retail and wholesale level. Only the
latter concern me here. Regarding the former, see ibid.at paras. 106 (where she condemns the majority
for misconceiving the issue), para. 171 (where she accuses it of misunderstanding the civil law of
contract) and paras. 104-105 (where she criticizes it for misrepresenting the significance of s. 21. 1 of
the Divorce Act and running roughshod over the record).
47. Ibid. atpara. 132.
48. Ibid. at para. 175.
49. Ibid. atpara. 182.
50. Ibid. atpara. 184.
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soft-sell apologetic of "proceeding on a case-by-case basis": the issue now
open is so large and so deep to make of that "a short-sighted approach."'"
2.

The majority:protectingcitizensfrom their religion

a. Content
Though the majority judgment is an untidy and in consequence somewhat
tricky affair, everything finally turns on the Court's view that it falls to
the judicial branch "to ensure that members of the Canadian public are
not arbitrarily disadvantaged by their religion. 52 At the retail level, this
astounding and novel view arises from the Court's attempt to salvage the
result at trial. This it did, as mentioned previously, by seeking to tame,
or so it apparently thought, the scope of judicial meddling in religion
permitted by the trial court's reasoning. According to the majority, in
fact scenarios like Bruker, not only must the religious undertaking be
clothed in contract (and thus the Court endorses the alchemy of form),53
the breach of it must not offend "Canada's fundamental values" 5 4 (and
if it does, judicial sanction will, as here, necessarily55 follow). At the
wholesale level, this view of judicial obligation and permission expresses,
in my view, the Court's utter misunderstanding of religious liberty. And
it is here, much more so than in its salvaging of the trial result, that the
importance of Bruker resides. For the Court's misconception of the point
of religious liberty leads it first to discover the curious obligation of saving
citizens from the arbitrary disadvantages of their religions and then to
articulate a meter of disadvantage that awards the state, through its judges,
sovereignty over religion. Together these matters-the Court's notion of the
origin and content of freedom of religion and its claim of sovereignty to
combat disadvantage-provide the gist and, as we shall see, the threat of its
precedent-setting judgment in Bruker.
The Court tips its hand on the origins of religious liberty with Abella
J.'s opening declaration. "Canada," we are told, "rightly prides itself on its
evolutionary tolerance for diversity and pluralism."56 She continues:

51. Ibid. at para. 182.
52. Ibid. at para. 19.
53. Ibid. at paras. 48-64 where Abella J. finds Paragraph 12 a binding contract under the civil law
of Quebec. For what is in my view an overwhelming critique of the majority's understanding and
application of the civil law of contract, see Deschamps J.'s dissent at paras. 162-180.
54. Ibid. at para. 2.
55. 1say necessarily because if a fundamental Canadian value is offended, harm by definition ensues:
see infra notes 74 -75 and accompanying text.
56. Bruker, supra note 2 at para. I
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This journey has included a growing appreciation of multiculturalism,
including the recognition that ethnic, religious or cultural differences
will be acknowledged and respected. Endorsed in legal instruments
ranging from statutory protections found in human rights codes to their
constitutional enshrinement in the Canadian Charter of Rights and

Freedoms, the right to integrate into Canada's mainstream based on
and notwithstanding
these differences has become a defining part of our
57
national character.
This is to say, of course, both that religious liberty is a derivative right
and that it is properly derived from values-here multiculturalism-which
the state endorses. Both of these proposals stand in starkest contrast to
the standing view of religious liberty. According to that understanding,
freedom of religion, like the right to bodily security and property and
contract rights, is a natural right in the sense that it exists prior to and
independently from the state.5 8 So viewed, religious liberty is necessarily
a negative liberty that forbids the state predatory management of the
religious conduct and conscience of its subjects. The state is not the author
of the right but its custodian, and its role is to acknowledge and to honour
religious life that, like persons and property, exists beyond the state and for
the protection of which the state exists. Now, as witness the judgments in
Bruker at the Quebec Court of Appeal and by the minority at the Supreme
Court, this does not mean that the state must honour and protect all religious
conduct. Clearly, where religious conduct violates rights of the person
(and sometimes, though less clearly, property or contractual rights)-or as
the Quebec Court and the dissent put it, where such conduct violates a
legitimate rule of positive law-religious liberty does not immunize the

57. Ibid. (emphasis added).
58. That this is so has long been recognized in the Court's own jurisprudence. In Saumur v. City
of Quebec & A.G. Quebec, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641 at 670, Justice Rand put the matter thus (emphasis
added):
Strictly speaking, civil rights arise from positive law; but freedom of speech, religion and the
inviolability of the person, are originalfreedomswhich are at once necessary attributes and
modes of self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their community
life within a legal order. It is in the circumscription of these librerties by the creation of
civil rights in persons who may be injured by their exercise, and by the sanctions of public
law, that the positive law operates. What we realize is the residue inside that periphery.
Their significant relation to our law resides in this, that under its principles to which there
are only minor exceptions, there is no prior or antecedent restraint placed upon them: the
penalties, civil or criminal, attach to results which their exercise may bring about, and apply
as consequential incidents. So we have the civil rights against defamation, assault, false
imprisonment and the like and the punishments of the criminal law. ... Civil rights of the
same nature arise also as protection against the infringement of these freedoms.
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conduct from curial supervision.59 But, and this is the point, that this is
so in no way renders religious liberty a state-derived right any more than
does punishment for sexual assault or murder render the right to bodily
security a derivative right. Just the contrary: as we punish the offender
in order to acknowledge the supremacy and independence of the right to
security, we may sanction rule-violating religious conduct to acknowledge
the supremacy and independence of the right to religious liberty. That this
is so is no more mysterious than Mill's harm principle, which is to say, not
at all. Nor is it at all foreign to the Court's own jurisprudence on religious
liberty. Indeed, it was perfectly and succinctly put by Dickson J. in R. v.
Big MDrug Mart Ltd:

The values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions demand
that every individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and
opinions his or her conscience dictates, provided inter alia only that such
manifestations do not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights
to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of their own.6"
However, if religious liberty is, as the majority has it, a derivative right,
then an entirely different relationship between state and religion emerges.
Abella J. puts the matter thus:
The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean that those
differences are always hegemonic. Not all differences are compatible
with Canadas fundamental values and, accordingly, not all barriers

to their expression are arbitrary. Determining when the assertion of a
right based upon difference must yield to a morepressingpublic interest

is a complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line
application. It is, at the same time, a delicate necessityfor the protecting
the evolutionary integrity ofboth multiculturalismandpublic confidence
in its importance.6'

So not only is religious liberty derived from state values, its content, at
any given point in time, depends upon how pressing is the state value
that any assertion of the right might engage. According to the majority, it
59. Finnis puts this limitation as follows: the religious act or belief must be "compatible with laws
motivated exclusively by concern to uphold a just public order, that is, ... the rights of others, public
peace and public morality": supra note 24 at 117.
60. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at p. 346. In Bruker, the majority appears to
think that the "inter alia" provides license to its derivative notion of religious liberty. It is clearly
wrong in this. When elsewhere in his judgment Dickson elaborates, the indicia of limitation he
mentions-"subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others": ibid. at p. 337-in no fashion supports either the
majority's derivative notion or the expanded state surveillance to which it leads. Those indicia rather
merely restate the standing view that religious liberty is subject to constitutionally legitimate laws.
61. Bruker, supra note 2 at para. 2 (emphasis added).
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falls to the judicial branch both to divine which of "Canada's fundamental
values" any claim of religious liberty engages and then to balance the
claim against that value. Included in the former are "our laws, policies,
and democratic values" 6 2 and mandated by the latter is judicial accounting
of "the particular religion, the particular religious right, and the particular
63
personal and public consequences, of enforcing that right.
This foundation laid, the Court proceeds to disclose the values at play
in Bruker and then to adopt and apply a balancing test fit to the case.
It turns out that Marcovitz's claim to religious immunity for his default
on Paragraph 12 of the Consent involves a veritable cascade of values
expressive of "the wider public interest."' First and foremost among
them is of course that "members of the Canadian public are not arbitrarily
disadvantaged by their religion." 65 But that does not nearly empty the Court's
value larder. Ejngaged as well (it turns out as indicia of disadvantage) are:
"our approach to marriage and divorce and our commitment to eradicating
gender discrimination" 66; "Canada's approach to religious freedom, to
equality rights, to divorce and marriage generally" 67 ; "our commitments
to equality, religious freedom and autonomous choice in marriage and
divorce" 68 ; "the right of Canadians to decide for themselves whether their
marriage has irretrievably broken down" and our "attempt to facilitate,
rather than impede, their ability to continue their lives, including with new
families" 69; our view that "marriage and divorce are available equally to

men and women"7"; and "the public interest in protecting equality rights,
the dignity of Jewish women in their independent ability to divorce and
remarry, as well as the public benefit in enforcing valid and binding
contractual obligations."'" The Court may fairly be said to have simply
discovered these values since, with one unhappy exception, it credentializes
none of them, either generally or as regards their propriety in matters of
religious liberty. The exception is "the dignity of Jewish women in their
independent ability to divorce and remarry" which it founds on s. 21.1 of
the DivorceAct and the Parliamentary addresses of two, now long-departed

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Ibid. at para.
Ibid. atpara.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid. at para.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para.

62.
18.
19.
16.
63.
80.
82.
92.
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Ministers of Justice (Doug Lewis and Kim Campbell).7 2 But, as the Court
of Appeal and the minority was each quick to point out, s. 21.1 has, by its
own terms, nothing whatsoever to do with the facts in Bruker.7 3
These then are the state values against which, in this case, religious
liberty is to be balanced. As mentioned, the Court felt moved to adopt a test,
beyond its general prescriptions on balancing,74 suited more specifically
to the facts in Bruker. This it found in Freedman C.J.M.'s dissent in Re
Morris and Morris, a 1973 judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 75
In Morris, an ex-wife sought to have the Court compel her ex-husband to
grant a Get based upon his undertaking in the Orthodox Jewish marriage
contract of Ketubah. The Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench granted an
order declaring the ex-wife's right to a Get and an order of mandamus
compelling the ex-husband to institute proceedings for the Get. 76 Four of

the five-member panel of the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and
refused to grant either a declaration or mandamus on grounds, inter alia,
that absent a violation of a civil right, the courts have no jurisdiction over
matters religious.
Abella J. for the majority instead finds Freedman C.J.M's dissent
"compelling" and adopts the following passage as expressing both the
proper judicial countenance on and the proper judicial test regarding the
reach of law over religion 77:

That the [marriage] contract is deeply affected by religious considerations
is not determinative of the issue. That is the beginning and not the end
of the matter. Some contracts rooted in the religion of a particular faith
may indeed be contrary to public policy. Others may not. Our task is
to determine whether the rights and obligations flowing from the ...
contract-specifically, the husband's obligation to give and the wife's
right to receive a Get-are contrary to public policy.
I find difficulty in pin-pointing the precise aspect of public policy which
the agreement [to provide a get] may be said to offend. The attack upon
it is on more general grounds. It appears that the real basis on which
the enforcement of the contract is being resisted is simply that it rests
on religion, and that on grounds ofpublic policy the Court should keep
72. Ibid. at paras. 7,8, 81.
73. For the Court of Appeal, see Bruker, supra note 7 at paras. 24, 29. For the dissent's commentary,
see ibid. at paras. 104, 105, 148.
74. Ibid. at paras. 2, 18, 19, 20.
75. Re Morris and Morris (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 550 (Man. C.A.). For contemporaneous
commentary on the case-commentary that would have served the majority well as regards the
problems with Freedman C.J.'s dissent -see D.P. Jones & A. Bissett-Johnston, "Re Morris and Morris:
A Case Comment" (1977) 23 McGill L. J. 110.
76. Re Morris and Morris (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 447 (Man. Q.B.).
77. Bruker, supra note 2 at para. 46.
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out of that field. But the law reports contain many instances of Courts
dealing with disputes having a religious origin or basis.... In each case
some temporal right confronted the Court, and it did not hesitate to
adjudicate thereon.78

Freedman C.J.M.'s dissent is then an early and happily unsuccessful attempt
to shed the constraints imposed on the state and its judges by the tradition of
religious liberty. He wishes not to be kept out of the field of religion and in
order not to be, he, like the majority in Bruker, misconceives the tradition
and the jurisprudence that expresses both its content and limits.7 9
With constraint thus put paid and with the mass of sacred state values
marshalled against him, Marcovitz was fated to lose in the Court's game
of balancing. And so it was. First, Abella J. opines, "Mr. Marcovitz, it
seems to me, has little to put on the scales."8 Then, in restoring Mass J.'s
judgment, she concludes that the consequences of Marcovitz's failure to
honour Paragraph 12 "represented an unjustified and severe impairment of
[Bruker's] ability to live her life in accordance with this country's values
and her Jewish beliefs."'" And with that, for the Court, the matter was
82
ended.
b.

Consequences

Several passages in the Abella J.'s judgment give the impression that the
majority thought the decision in Bruker a matter of no great moment, not
perhaps as a one-off, but nonetheless as not terribly novel or exciting.
At one point, for instance, the Court describes Bruker as "yet another

78. Re Morris and Morris, supra note 75 at pp. 559-60 (emphasis added).
79. For the purposes of this comment, Ihave considered just the former and what I take to be the
Court's misunderstanding of the tradition of religious liberty. It has however in my view mangled
just as badly the jurisprudence of religious liberty which stands for the proposition re-proclaimed by
the Quebec Court of Appeal and the minority, namely, that absent a violation of a constitutionally
legitimate rule of positive law, the state has no business in the churches, mosques and temples of
the nation. On the mangling, see for instance Abella J.'s altogether remarkable failure to understand
Dickson J.'s judgment in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Lid: Bruker, supra note 2 at para. 72 and supra note
53.
80. Ibid. at para. 79.
81. Ibid. at para. 93.
82. Along the way (and besides the aforementioned excursion into the civil law of contract: supra
note 53), the Court paused to consider the matter of religious liberty in the context of the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (supra note 2 at paras. 65-80), and to bolster its findings
through a review of foreign law on "courts protecting Jewish women from husbands who refuse to
provide a religious divorce" (ibid.at paras. 83-90). The judgment is messy because the arguments and
propositions that count-and these are my concerns here-are haphazardly strewn among these parts. As
indicated earlier, it is not my purpose to deal with this structure, though as regards the majority's go at
comparative law, I would commend Deschamps J.'s devastating deconstruction of the case law upon
which the majority relies: ibid. at paras. 134-155.
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case" and opines "no new principle emerges from the result in this case.""
And at other points, it seeks carefully to distance itself from the religious
aspects of the case. 84 For example, early along, it declares that its decision
"is not, as implied by the dissent, an unwarranted secular trespass into
religious fields, nor does it amount to judicial sanction of the vagaries of
an individual's religion."85 If these passages truly reflect the majority's
view,8 6 then its understanding of the matters at play in Bruker is so woefully
wrong that it might be said of these judges that they knew not what they
do.
Writ large, Bruker stands for the proposition that the state is properly
possessed of a weltanschauung-the state's "fundamental values"8 7-to
which the conduct and projects of its subjects, including their religious
conduct and projects, are properly held to judicial account. Now, this might
be-and of course has been-true of certain kinds of states. But it has never
been true, nor can it ever be, of liberal states. This is so because liberal
states are, by definition and aspiration both, limited states. And states of
that kind and character-Rule of Law states or constitutional states: call
them what you will-are not in the business either of constructing valuesincluding, as here, nationalistic values- independently from the security
interests of their subjects or of forcefully declaring those values as the
core morality of the communities they serve. Nor therefore are they in the
business of surveilling the lives of their subjects, including especially their
religious lives, for their comportment with state values. Nor, in particular,
is it their business to save their subjects safe from the disadvantages,
arbitrary or otherwise, that their religious affiliations may carry for them.
Just the contrary: in societies governed by states of that limited sort, which
is to say, in free societies, people do that for themselves, should they so
wish, by acts of reformation or of apostasy.
83. Ibid. at para. 20
84. Ibid. at paras. 18, 47.
85. Ibid. at para. 18.
86. 1 believe they do and not merely because the alternative-that they were merely seeking to
persuade in a soft-sell sort of way-is so unhappy. Rather, in my view, the Court is so ideologically
uniform and so enraptured of its curious tale (and more on this in a moment) of the Constitution and,
as here, of the law more generally, as a repository and expression of Canadian values that the matter
and decision in Bruker most probably did appear to the majority as just another stop along the path
of articulating, defending and imprinting the state's values. Certainly, so far as the Chief Justice is
concerned, her extra-judicial writing seems to clinch this understanding. See for example, Beverley
McLachlin, "Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective" in D. Farrow, ed.,
Recognizing Religion in a Seeular Society (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press,
2004) 12 at 22 (where she argues that religious liberty derives from multiculturalism: "in Canadian
society there is the value we place on multiculturalism and diversity, which brings with it acommitment
to freedom of religion").
87. Bruker, supra note 2 at para. 2.
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deformation

of

liberal

constitutionalism has been growing for sometime at the Supreme Court,
and I cannot here trace its jurisprudential path.88 What I can very briefly do
is first to explain the deformation and then to explore the significance of its
extension in Bruker to religious matters.
Constitutionalism is the child of the Western Legal Tradition's
understanding of the necessity of law and of the dangers posed by law.89
The story is as simple as it is true. On the one hand, we humans9" need
law just because we are constituted the way we are. We are by nature
vulnerable beings-vulnerable to death at a time we know not when and
vulnerable to others in our bodies and in our projects. In order, therefore,
to survive ano to flourish, we turn to law's protection, to its rules of
ordered existence and freedom from harm. 9 1 On the other hand, law by its
very nature threatens the good of ordered liberty that it exists to deliver.
We invest law with authority in order to serve our interests in living our
lives in relative freedom, secure in our bodies, in our resources, and in our
relations with others. But the state is an all too human institution, and it

88. Though a path there surely is: see for example, Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1130 at para. 92 ("the Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and
.shape our democratic society"]. And just as surely, the path continues: see for example, the Court's
judgment in Health Services and Support-FacilitiesSubsector BargainingAssn. v. British Columbia
2007 SCC 27 at para. 81 (for the Court's latest list of the core communal values expressed and
enshrined in the Charter, namely, "[h]uman dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of
the person and the enhancement of democracy") and paras. 39-41, 66, 68, 86 (where on grounds of
those Canadian values, the Court threw over its prior jurisprudence and constitutionalized collectiVe
bargaining). Indeed, constitutionalism as the articulation and consolidation of state values has become,
in my view, an id~efixe at the Supreme Court, and it deserves serious scholarly interrogation, not
least because the notion that the constitution is an expression of the community's values proceeds
from the profoundly mistaken and painfully anti-democratic view that a proper state is a Kulturstaat.
For a happy historical dissent from this view, see Janet Ajzenstat, The CanadianFounding: John
Locke and Parliament (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007). For what appears to be
the commencement of a metaphysics of the Court's jurisprudence on state values and religion, see
Benjamin L. Berger, "The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance" (2008) 21 Can. J. Law & Jurisp. 245;
Benjamin L. Berger, "Law's Religion: Rendering Culture" (2007) 45 Osg. H. L.J. 277.
89. For the best account of the origins and content of the Western Legal Tradition: see Harold J.
Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1983) and Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II.The Impact of the
ProtestantReformations on the Western Legal Tradition(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2003). For a convenient overview, see also Philippe Nemo, What is the West? trans. Kenneth Casler
(Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2006).
90. "Human," which is to say, creatures who, unlike the rest, can acknowledge and reflect and act
upon their nature culturally.
91. Herbert Hart's philosophical anthropology is the best modem exposition of the natural necessity
of law: see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2 1ded. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 192-199.
Along with human vulnerability, Hart lists "approximate equality," "limited altruism," "limited
resources," and "limited understanding and strength of will" as "some very obvious generalizationsindeed truisms-concerning human nature and the world in which men live."
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may be moved to act against our interests. This it may do in either of two
ways.
First, a state might articulate values independent and separate from the
protection interests of its subjects and then seek to impose those values on
them. This it will do, at least in the context of liberal governance, when
it mistakes liberal political morality as properly prescribing a way of life
for individuals (and not merely and only as prescribing an institutional
life for political community)92 ; and when it makes that mistake, it will
feel compelled to require the forms of life of its subjects to conform to the
view of proper life its values express and support. Second, a state might
differentiate between its subjects in ways that make the quality of law's
protection depend upon the class in which the state has placed any one of
its subjects. These two possibilities of law-legal imperialism (or as it is
sometimes styled, "civic totalism")93 and legal discrimination-are, in our
tradition, the foundational problems of law.
Constitutionalism is the Western Legal Tradition's answer to the riddle
born of the coupling of necessity and menace. The answer resides in two
propositions: that the only legitimate state is a limited state; and that states
are properly limited by certain institutional forms and commitments.94
Chief among the latter are the division of life between the public and the
private and the view that private life is prior and superior to public life.
From this division and understanding descends the threshold condition to
limited government: states only have authority over public matters and
they are therefore forbidden authority over private matters.95

92. Dworkin puts the difference more succinctly than most: "the liberal conception of equality
is a principle of political organization that is required by justice not a way of life for individuals.'.'
See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) at
203. See also John Finnis, "On 'Public Reason' (April 2006) Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No.
06-37; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1/2007 at 6 (available at SSRN: <http://ssm.com/
abstracts=955815>): "The proper function of the state's law and government is limited. In particular,
its role is not (as Aristotle had supposed) to make people integrally good but only to maintain peace
and justice in inter-personal relationships. In this respect, the public realm, the respublica,is different
from certain other associations, such as family and church, associations which, albeit with limited
means, can properly aspire to bring it about that their members become integrally good."
93. See for example Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University
Press, 2000) at 130.
94. These institutional investments-the distinction between public and private life, the separation of
powers, and rule governance (and all that each requires)-together constitute the Rule of Law, the ideal
and practice of liberal constitutionalism.
95. Incidentally, the prohibition does not, as is oftentimes claimed, work in the other direction,
that is, limited government does not require prohibiting the institutions of private life from seeking
to influence the state, provided only that the influence does not subvert political morality and most
especially legal equality. Nor, that caveat once again observed, does it prevent public officials from
relying on the commitments of their private lives in carrying out their public duties.
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I mentioned in opening this inquiry the sanctity of religion and family
in our political and legal affairs. This special and elevated position has
two aspects. First, the prohibition against state sovereignty over private
life reaches its apotheosis in its application to faith and family. This is to
say that, in our tradition, only if faith and family are secure from state
management and predation is a state a constitutional state. Second, this is
so because our tradition understands family and rieligious life as the sites in
which men and women most directly and importantly make their lives their
own. Rawls famously contrasts the public reason of constitutionalism with
what he terms comprehensive doctrines. 96 The concern of the former is "the
political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of
their interpretation (including those of the judiciary)." 97 Comprehensive

doctrines reside in "the culture of the social, not the political"98 and it
is in their engagement with and allegiance to those doctrines-and the
"conceptions of what it is of value in human life, and ideals of personal
character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit
of our life as a whole" 99 that those doctrines alone properly prescribe-that
men and women make a way of life for themselves. Because it concerns
the meaning of life tout court, religion is the most comprehensive of
doctrines. Because family is the practice through which comprehensive
doctrines, religion not only included, are first adopted and transmitted,
family is the foundry both of the traditions of life well and properly lived
and, in its independence from the state, of personal and social liberty.
Conclusion
So we come to the significance ofthe Court'sjudgment in Bruker. I want first
to propose that by extending the neo-constitutionalism of its self-conceived
Kulturstaatto religion and to family-on the facts there before it-to a private
matter involving both faith and family and their relationship both to one
another and to the state-the Court has put in jeopardy of expanded state
colonization those practices that are most dear and meaningful to those
whose liberty and forms of life it is pledged by constitutional principle
and tradition to serve and protect. That is to say, the judgment in Bruker
discloses a Court so convinced of and so committed to the righteousness
of imprinting its understanding of state values on the life-world that in the
wake of this judgment, it is difficult to discern anything, logic and principle
96.
97.
98.
99.

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
Ibid.at 13-14.
Ibid.at 14.
Ibid.at 13.
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alike, that might ever convince this Court to cease its totalizing impulse. In
consequence, we may, I think, expect no relief from the Court's relentless
march towards the subordination of private life, its values, practices and
traditions, to the sovereignty of judicially-manufactured state values. That
the substance of this disclosure is the Court's transmutation of religious
liberty from a negative freedom to be let alone to a state-centred positive
liberty not to be "arbitrarily disadvantaged"'0 0 by religion leaves the matter
of liberty under and through law in all the more precarious a position.
For in this facile paternalism resides a pernicious message. It informs that
the loss of real liberty is yet a good since, in the Court's view, it is a
foundational good of our law that the law's subjects be relieved through
law of the burdens and responsibilities of their private lives.

100. Bruker,supra note 2.at para. 19.

